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Introduction
Exchange-rate movements a®ect expected future cash°ows, and therefore their returns, by changing the home currency value of foreign revenues (costs) and the terms of competition for large multinationals and small exporters (importers). In light of this, it is surprising that previous research in the area [Jorion (1990) , Amihud (1993) and Bodnar and Gentry (1993)] nds that no U.S. multinationals, exporters, or manufacturing industries are signi¯cantly a®ected by exchange-rate movements.
One possible explanation is the fact that corporations make extensive use of foreign currency derivatives and other hedging instruments (e.g., foreign debt) to protect themselves 1 from unexpected movements of exchange rates. To the extent that U.S. multinationals, exporters, and importers fully cover their exposure to exchange-rate movements, we should not expect to¯nd any e®ect of exchange-rate movements on¯rms' values. However, derivatives can also be used for speculative purposes, as alleged in the recent, much publicized stories of Procter & Gamble and Metallgesellschaft. This creates a genuine concern by investors and regulators as to what role derivatives play for a corporation.
In this paper, we examine whether¯rms use foreign currency derivatives for hedging or for speculative purposes. In particular, to identify a¯rm's hedging or speculative behavior in the data, we examine the e®ect of foreign currency derivative use on its exchange-rate risk (exposure) and the determinants of the amount of derivative use. We measure exchange-rate exposure as the sensitivity of the value of the¯rm, proxied by the¯rm's stock return, to an unanticipated change in an exchange rate, as de¯ned in Adler and Dumas (1984) . Speci¯cally, we test the hypothesis that using foreign currency derivatives for hedging reduces a¯rm's foreign exchange-rate exposure, and that the degree to which¯rms use derivatives is related to its exposure through foreign sales and foreign trade.
Many papers examine which theory of optimal hedging is consistent with the use of 2 derivatives that we observe in the data. However, there is no direct evidence that derivatives are actually used to hedge. Hentschel and Kothari (1997) and Simkins and Laux (1997) examine directly¯rms' use of currency derivatives, but the former does not¯nd any evidence and the latter¯nds only weak evidence that their use in°uences exposure. However, given that a¯rm's exchange-rate exposure is determined by both its real operations (i.e., foreign sales) and its¯nancial hedging activities, we estimate a multivariate regression that links a¯rm's exposure to both those factors. This contrasts with Hentschel and Kothari, who rely only on univariate tests. We also use a continuous variable for hedging, instead of the dummy variable used by Simkins and Laux. When the dummy is used by itself, it appears to be negatively related to a¯rm's exposure. However, when the authors use their measure of hedging and foreign sales in the same model, the e®ect of the hedging dummy is no longer signi¯cant and its sign (positive) is inconsistent with the hypothesis that¯rms use derivatives to hedge.
Using the sample of all S&P 500 non¯nancial¯rms for 1993, we¯nd that a¯rm's exchange-rate exposure is positively related to its ratio of foreign sales to total sales, and negatively related to its ratio of foreign currency derivatives to total assets. These associations are signi¯cant at the 1% level and robust to alternative time periods, exchange-rate indices, and estimation techniques. Our evidence strongly supports the hypothesis that¯rms use foreign currency derivatives, not to speculate in the foreign exchange markets, but as protection against exchange-rate movements. Our evidence also provides an explanation for the lack of signi¯cant exchange-rate exposure that has been documented in past studies. In addition, our results con¯rm and extend those of Jorion (1990) , who uses a sample of major U.S. multinationals to show that a¯rm's exchange-rate exposure is positively related to its ratio of foreign sales to total sales.
We use a two-stage framework (Cragg, 1971) , to examine what determines corporations' level of derivative use. This two-stage process allows us to examine separately a¯rm's decision to hedge from its decision of how much to hedge. Similar to Geczy, Minton, and Schrand (1997) , we¯nd that¯rms with larger size, R&D expenditures, and exposure to exchange rates through foreign sales or foreign trade are more likely to use currency derivatives. These results are consistent with the Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein (1993) theory of optimal hedging, and also high¯xed start-up costs of hedging explanations. While these tests reveal the factors that prompt corporations to hedge, they do not answer the question of what determines the extent of hedging. Using ¡in the second stage of the estimation¡ the notional amount of currency derivatives for those¯rms that chose to hedge, we¯nd that exposure factors (foreign sales and foreign trade) are the sole determinants of the degree of hedging. In other words, given that a¯rm decides to hedge, the decision of how much to hedge is a®ected solely by its exposure to foreign currency movements through foreign sales and trade. This result provides additional support to our hypothesis that¯rms use currency derivatives for hedging purposes.
Finally, foreign debt can be another way to hedge foreign currency exposure. As in the case of foreign currency derivatives, we examine separately a¯rm's decision to issue foreign debt and its decision of how much foreign debt to issue. Again, we¯nd that exposure through foreign sales is positively and signi¯cantly related to a¯rm's decision to issue foreign debt and to the level of foreign debt. Overall, these¯ndings are consistent with our hypothesis that¯rms use foreign debt to hedge their exchange-rate exposure.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 1 describes our sample; section 2 presents the tests of the relation between exchange-rate exposure and foreign currency derivatives; section 3 presents the tests on the use and amount of foreign currency derivatives; and section 4 concludes.
Sample Description
SFAS 105 requires all¯rms to report information about¯nancial instruments that have o®-balance sheet risk (e.g., futures, forwards, options, and swaps) for¯scal years ending after June 15, 1990. In particular,¯rms must report the face, contract, or notional amount of thē nancial instrument, and information on the credit and market risk of those instruments, the cash requirements, and the related accounting policy. Prior to SFAS 105,¯rms were required to report information only on futures contracts. Disclosure was very limited for other o®-balance sheet risk¯nancial instruments.
We obtain data on year-end notional value of forward contracts reported in the footnotes of the annual reports of all the S&P 500 non¯nancial¯rms in 1993. We exclude S&P 500 nancial¯rms, because most of them are also market-makers in foreign currency derivatives; hence, their motivation for using derivatives could be very di®erent from that of the non¯nancial¯rms.
Our sample's notional values of foreign currency derivatives also includes foreign currency options, if a¯rm disclosed a combined number. However, these values do not include foreign currency swaps. Currency swaps are mainly used by corporations in conjunction with foreign debt, e®ectively translating foreign debt into domestic liability. In the Bodnar et al. (1995) report of a survey on the use of derivatives of a large sample of U.S. non¯nancial corporations, the instrument used by 48% of the¯rms in the sample to manage exchange-rate risk was forwards.
Using the dollar notional value of foreign currency derivatives has several advantages over using a binary variable to indicate whether or not a¯rm uses foreign currency derivatives.
For example, by using this continuous variable, we can test hypotheses on the determinants of the amount of hedging and examine the impact of a¯rm's currency derivative use on its exchange-rate exposure. However, a disadvantage of this measure is that since¯rms were not required to disclose the direction of the hedge during the period of our tests, we do not know whether the amounts of foreign currency derivatives represent a short, a long, or a net position in the underlying currency. Despite the possible measurement error introduced by the hedge's lack of direction, our continuous variable nevertheless provides valuable insights. derivatives. In all of our tests we use the ratio of foreign currency derivatives to total assets. However, we obtain similar results when we use the ratio of foreign currency derivatives to foreign sales as our independent variable. For all the¯rms in our sample, we also obtained data from the DISCLOSURE database on year-end foreign revenues (sales) from operations abroad. FASB 14 requires¯rms to report geographical segment information for¯scal years ending after December 15, 1977.
Firms must report audited footnote information for segments whose sales, assets, or pro¯ts exceed 10% of consolidated totals. Approximately 59% of the¯rms in our sample report revenues from foreign operations. These revenues represent 19.8% of their total sales. On average, a¯rm covers 14.5% of its foreign sales with foreign currency derivatives. Where foreign revenues are not reported, we assume that they are zero. However, we also check the robustness of our results by assuming that the unreported foreign revenues are missing.
This assumption does not materially a®ect our results.
Exchange-Rate Exposure and Currency Derivatives
In this section, we examine the impact of the use of derivatives on exchange-rate exposure.
Our hypothesis is that if¯rms use foreign currency derivatives to protect themselves from exchange-rate movements (i.e., as a hedge), then we should expect that derivatives will reduce exchange-rate exposure. We¯rst present our methodology, and then our tests and results.
Estimation framework
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where 3 See, e.g., Jorion (1990) , Amihud (1993) , and Allayannis (1996) .
R is the rate of return on the ith¯rm's common stock in period t it R is the rate of return on the market portfolio in period t mt F XI is the rate of return on a moving, trade-weighted exchange rate index, measured in t 4 U.S. dollars per unit of foreign currencies in period t
In Equation (1),¯represents the exchange-rate exposure. Similar to a market beta, We estimate the exchange-rate exposure of the¯rms in our sample using model 1. We estimate each¯rm's exposure in our 1993 sample using monthly return data during the three years surrounding 1993 (1992-94) . This is appropriate, since we want to measure the contemporaneous impact of foreign currency derivatives on a¯rm's exchange-rate exposure.
However, we also use a longer time interval (¯ve years) to estimate exposures between 1991 and 1995. Finally, we use monthly data instead of daily or weekly, since daily and weekly exchange rate indices are noisier and usually su®er from nonsynchronicity problems (nonalignment of stock-return and exchange-rate series).
In the second stage, we examine the potential impact of a¯rm's currency derivative use on its exchange-rate exposure. Exchange-rate exposure is simultaneously determined by ā rm's real operations (i.e., foreign sales) and its¯nancial hedging. Therefore, we include both factors in the cross-sectional regression equation shown below:
wherê is a¯rm's exchange-rate exposure estimated in (1)
2i
(F S=T S) is a¯rm's ratio of foreign sales to total sales i (F CD=T A) is a¯rm's ratio of foreign currency derivatives to total assets i
Tests and results
Given the de¯nition of our index in U.S. dollars per unit of foreign currency, an appreciation of the dollar would decrease the index. We expect an exporter or a¯rm with revenues from operations abroad to be hurt by an exchange-rate appreciation (i.e., the return on its stock should decrease), thus producing a positive exchange-rate exposure. However, if a¯rm imports, then an appreciation of the dollar should bene¯t it (i.e., the return on its 6 stock should increase), producing a negative exposure. For a given exposure, an increase in revenues from foreign operations should increase exposure. Hence, our hypothesis suggests that exchange-rate exposure should be positively related to the ratio of foreign sales to total sales.
On the other hand, if¯rms use foreign currency derivatives to hedge against exchangerate movements, then the use of derivatives should reduce their foreign exchange exposure.
That is, the use of derivatives should decrease exchange-rate exposure for¯rms with positive exposures and increase (decrease in absolute value) exchange-rate exposure for¯rms with negative exposures. Therefore, if¯rms use derivatives as a hedge against exchange-rate movements, the percentage use of derivatives should be negatively related to the absolute values of the exchange rate exposures. We cannot hypothesize any relation between the absolute value of foreign currency exposure and the ratio of foreign sales to total sales, or between foreign currency exposure and (absolute value of) currency derivative used. Table 2 presents the coe±cient estimates of model 2, which links a¯rm's exchangerate exposure (estimated from model 1) with its determinants, namely the percentage of foreign sales and the percentage of foreign currency derivatives used. In the¯rst regression (¯rst column in Table 2 ), we consider all exposures, both positive and negative. Consistent with our hypothesis, we¯nd a strong positive relation between exchange-rate exposure and the ratio of foreign sales to total sales. In the second regression (second column in Table   2 ), we examine the relation between exchange-rate exposure and¯rms' foreign currency derivative use, using the absolute value of the exposures. Consistent with a¯rm's hedging motive for the use of foreign currency derivatives, we¯nd a negative, statistically signi¯cant association between the absolute value of the exposures and the percentage use of foreign currency derivatives.
However, the drawback of these regressions is that they only test predictions of how either foreign sales or currency derivatives a®ect exchange-rate exposure. Since we observe an ex-post exposure (beta) that is determined by both foreign operations and¯nancial hedging, the regression that does not include both factors su®ers from an omitted variables problem. This problem could be more severe in this case, because the two factors, foreign sales and currency derivative use, are positively correlated. This problem is present in the Hentschel and Kothari (1997) study, in which the authors rely exclusively on such univariate tests. To include both variables in the regression, we must focus either on the positive or the negative exposures. Because the presence of foreign sales creates a positive exposure, we chose to perform our multivariate tests by using the sample of positive exposures. In addition, foreign sales is an exposure factor for which¯rm-level data is available, in contrast to imports and exports, for which only industry-level data is available.
We present results for the sample of¯rms with positive exposures in the third column of Table 2 . Consistent with our hypothesis that¯rms use currency derivatives as a hedge, we¯nd strong evidence that exchange-rate exposure increases with the percentage of foreign sales and decreases with the percentage of foreign currency derivatives. Our results on both the use of foreign currency derivatives and foreign sales are statistically signi¯cant at the 1% 7 level.
Robustness tests
We perform several additional tests on the sample of positive exposures to examine the robustness of our results. First, we examine whether our results depend on the three-year time 7 We obtain similar results when we use White-adjusted errors.
interval (1992-94) that we use to estimate¯rm exposures. We therefore estimate exposures using a longer (¯ve-year) time interval . Regression 1 in Table 3 presents the results of this test. The results are very similar to those of the base-case regression (Regression 3, Table 2 ). Consistent with our hypothesis, we¯nd a strong positive relation between foreign sales and exposure, and a strong negative relation between foreign currency derivatives use and currency exposure.
Next, we examine whether our results are robust to the use of an alternative exchangerate index to estimate a¯rm's exposure in the¯rst stage of the estimation. Instead of using J.P Morgan's narrow, nominal dollar index (against 18 currencies), we use the broad, real, dollar index published by the Dallas Fed (against 101 currencies). Although¯rm exposure might be captured better using a broader currency index, the impact of derivative use might be captured better using a narrow, nominal currency index. However, the choice of index does not a®ect our results (Regression 2, Table 3 ), since the use of derivatives (foreign sales)
is signi¯cantly negatively (positively) related to a¯rm's exchange-rate exposure.
We also re-estimate the relation between exchange-rate exposure and currency derivatives use for the sample of S&P 500 non¯nancial¯rms that disclosed currency derivative use in their 1992 annual reports (Regression 3, Table 3 ). Similar to our base-case regression, we estimate¯rms' exposures using a three-year period (1991) (1992) (1993) ) and the J.P Morgan dollar index. Our results, which suggest that currency derivatives are used for hedging, extend to the 1992 sample, as the use of currency derivatives signi¯cantly reduces¯rm exchange-rate exposure. In this sample, the ratio of foreign sales to total sales is also positively related to a¯rm's exchange-rate exposure, but is not statistically signi¯cant.
Our last two alternative tests examine di®erent estimation methods. First, we re-estimate model 2 by using weighted least squares. In this case, the weighting factor is the inverse of the standard error of the exposure coe±cients estimated by model 1. Weighted least squares assigns more weight to the more precise estimates and therefore can increase the accuracy of our second-stage regression. The results, presented in Regression 4, remain unchanged.
Again, consistent with our hypothesis, the use of currency derivatives signi¯cantly reduces a¯rm's exchange-rate exposure.
Finally, we re-estimate model 2, using a probit estimation, in which the dependent variable is a binary variable which equals one if a¯rm's exposure is statistically signi¯cant at the 10% level, and zero otherwise (Regression 5, Table 3 ). This procedure could be viewed as an extreme weighting scheme under which only statistically signi¯cant estimates are considered. Approximately 22% of the¯rms in our sample with positive exposures have statistically signi¯cant exposures. Again, the results are consistent with our hypothesis.
Overall, our results are robust to alternative time intervals, exchange-rate indices, and estimation techniques (weighted least squares or probit). While our robustness tests are not independent, they nevertheless strongly support our hypothesis. In addition, our results complement and extend those in Jorion (1990) , in which exchange-rate exposures of U.S. multinationals are shown as positively related to the ratio of foreign sales to total sales. By introducing the¯rms' percentage of foreign currency derivatives in our tests, we can examine the role of derivatives by corporations. Our results strongly con¯rm our hypothesis that¯rms use foreign currency derivatives to hedge against exchange-rate movements, rather than to speculate in foreign exchange markets. Our results also provide an explanation for the lack of signi¯cant exposure documented in past studies.
3. Empirical examination of hedging theories has been hampered by the general unavailability of data on hedging activities. Until the beginning of the 1990s, a¯rm's exact position in derivatives was privately held information, and was considered a very important component of strategic competitiveness. It is only recently that corporations have been required to disclose in footnotes in their annual reports, the notional amount of derivatives they are using.
In the absence of reported information on derivatives, most of the earlier studies used survey data to examine why¯rms use derivatives. For example, Nance, Smith, and Smithson (1993) Tufano (1996) examines commodity hedging activities in the gold mining industry. He¯nds that¯rms' use of commodity derivatives is negatively related to the number of options their managers and directors hold, and positively related to the value of their stock holdings, evidence consistent with theories of managerial risk aversion (e.g., Stulz, 1984) . Haushalter (1997) examines the hedging activities of oil and gas producers. Hē nds that total debt ratio is positively related to the percentage of production hedged, which is consistent with theories of transaction costs of¯nancial distress. Visvanathan (1995) examines the use of interest rate swaps by S&P 500 non¯nancial¯rms, and also¯nds evidence 8 supporting theories of transaction costs of¯nancial distress (e.g., Smith and Stulz, 1985) .
Finally, Mian (1996) investigates all three types of hedging activities for a sample of 3,022 rms and¯nds mixed evidence for theories of managerial risk aversion and taxes. He¯nds evidence that does not support the¯nancial distress theories, and evidence that uniformly supports the hypothesis that hedging activities exhibit economies of scale (i.e., that larger rms hedge more).
All of the studies cited above have examined which factors could be associated with the probability that a¯rm hedges. With the exception of Tufano (1996) and Haushalter (1997), who also examine the level of hedging in a particular industry (gold, and oil and gas respectively), no other study in the general derivatives area has looked for the factors that are associated with the extent of hedging.
In this paper, we examine this question in the context of foreign currency hedging and for a large cross-section of industries. Testing the determinants of the amount of hedging can provide additional evidence for the use of foreign currency derivatives as a hedge. In particular, if a¯rm uses such hedges, we expect its decision on how much to hedge to dependent on its exposure through foreign sales and foreign trade. Our¯ndings would add to the evidence of the previous section, suggesting that¯rms use currency derivatives to hedge.
Tests and results
A¯rm can make its hedging decision in one step, deciding whether or not to hedge and how much to hedge; or in two steps, deciding how much to hedge only after it has decided to hedge.
Ultimately, this is an empirical question. We test it here in the context of foreign currency derivative use by¯rms. We model a¯rm's one-step hedging decision using a Tobit method, because the continuous dependent variable that we use on the percentage of foreign currency derivatives is censored at zero (i.e., there are a signi¯cant number of zero observations). To model separately a¯rm's decision to hedge from its decision of how much to hedge, and identify the relevant factors for each decision, we implement a two-stage process originally suggested by Cragg (1971) .
In contrast to the simple Tobit model which constraints the coe±cients on the factors associated with the decisions to hedge and how much to hedge to be the same, the Cragg model allows these two decisions to be independent. In the¯rst stage, using all¯rms, we estimate a binomial probit model in which the decision to hedge is related to variables that are broadly consistent with theories of optimal hedging and controls for exchange-rate 9 exposure. In the second stage, using only those¯rms that chose to engage in hedging, we estimate a truncated regression using the amount of derivative use as a dependent variable.
We¯nd that a two-step decision process¯ts the data better. Therefore, we examine further only the Cragg model's tests and results. Haushalter (1997) used a similar approach to examine the extent of oil and gas derivatives.
We¯rst present the variables that proxy for optimal hedging theories and exposure to exchange-rate movements. We then proceed with the results of the Cragg model. We use similar variables to those used by Minton, Geczy, and Schrand (1997) . Speci¯cally, to test theories of hedging related to agency costs (underinvestment), we use the R&D expenditures, de¯ned as the ratio of R&D to total sales; dividend yield, de¯ned as the ratio of total dividend paid to share price; and the ratio of market to book, de¯ned as the ratio of the sum of market value of equity and book value of debt to total assets, as proxies for growth options in thē rm's investment opportunity. We use a tax dummy variable set equal to one if the¯rm has a tax-loss carryforward or investment tax credits, and zero otherwise, to test theories related to the reduction in expected taxes. We use ROA, de¯ned as the ratio of earnings before interest, taxes, and dividends (EBITD) to total assets and leverage, de¯ned as the ratio of 10 total debt to total assets, to test theories related to expected costs of¯nancial distress.
Finally, we control for the size of the¯rm (the logarithm of total assets), a factor that most previous studies found was positively related to a¯rm's decision to hedge. This is consistent with arguments related to the existence of large¯xed start-up costs of hedging. We also incorporated the total number of options held at the beginning of the year by the CEO and the total number of shares (both variables scaled by total shares outstanding), which we obtained from the Compustat ExecComp database, to test theories related to managerial risk aversion. Since neither variable is signi¯cant, and because they substantially reduce the number of observations, we do not include them here.
To control for exposure factors, we introduce the ratio of foreign sales to total sales and the share of total trade (imports and exports) in total production. Exports produce the same exposure to exchange rates as do foreign sales. An appreciation of the dollar hurts¯rms with foreign revenues or exports by reducing the dollar value of foreign-currency-denominated revenues. In contrast, an appreciation of the dollar bene¯ts importers by reducing the dollar value of the costs of imports. However, given that we only have the absolute value of foreign currency derivatives, we expect that both the import and export factors should be positively associated to the use of foreign currency derivatives. The decision to hedge should depend on the total foreign trade (imports plus exports) if they are in uncorrelated currencies or rms hedge them separately.
Information on imports and exports is not available at the¯rm level. However, the U.S.
Department of Commerce compiles annual import and export shares at the industry level, for 11 both the two and four-digit SIC classi¯cation, for the main U.S. manufacturing industries.
In our tests, we match¯rms with their industry import (export) share for the four-digit SIC 12 where available, otherwise for the two-digit.
Regression 1 in Table 4 , presents the results of the¯rst-stage binomial probit model. Our ndings are similar to those obtained by Geczy, Minton, and Schrand (1997) decision on the extent of hedging. This result adds to our evidence of the previous section that¯rms use currency derivatives to hedge their exchange-rate exposure, rather than to 15 speculate in the foreign exchange markets.
The determinants of the level of foreign debt
In addition to foreign currency derivatives,¯rms can also use foreign debt to protect themselves from exposure to exchange rate movements. A¯rm with revenues denominated in foreign currencies (cash in°ows) can issue foreign debt, since this creates a stream of cash out°ows in a foreign currency.
We examine separately a¯rm's decision to issue foreign debt and its decision on how much debt to issue. Our hypothesis suggests that if¯rms use foreign debt as a hedge, then exposure factors (i.e., foreign sales and trade) should be important in the¯rm's decision to issue debt and in its decision on how much debt to issue. Finally, we test a model of choice of hedging instrument, comparing foreign currency derivatives and foreign debt.
We obtain the year-end data on foreign debt for 1993 from the long-term debt footnote in rms' annual reports. Where a¯rm has used foreign currency swaps to e®ectively translate foreign debt into a domestic liability, we use the net amount of foreign debt. Similarly, swaps that are identi¯ed with a domestic loan (which has converted domestic debt into foreign debt) are captured by the measurement of foreign debt. However, in our sample we do not account for swaps that were not associated with a particular loan. Compared to the relatively large percentage of¯rms that use foreign currency derivatives (42.6%), only 21.8% of the¯rms in our sample use foreign debt. Table 5 presents the results of our tests on foreign debt. In the¯rst stage (Regression 1), we use all the variables that we used in the previous tests on the use of foreign currency derivatives. Again, the dependent variable is a binary indicating whether or not a¯rm uses foreign debt. We note that since foreign debt represents a cash out°ow in a foreign currency, it can only be used as a hedge when a¯rm has foreign revenues (cash in°ows), either from operations abroad or from exports. By contrast, imports, which also represent a cash out°ow in a foreign currency, cannot be hedged through foreign debt. Therefore we do not use them in these tests.
We¯nd a signi¯cant positive relation between the ratio of foreign sales to total sales and a¯rm's decision to use foreign debt. We also¯nd that larger¯rms are more prone to use foreign debt. Finally, we do not¯nd any evidence that exporters are more likely to issue foreign debt, nor that any of the remaining variables are signi¯cantly associated with thē rm's decision to issue debt. This result is generally consistent with our hypothesis.
In the second stage (Regression 2), using only those¯rms that chose to issue foreign debt, we examine the determinants of the amount of foreign debt issue. To preserve our observations, we use only those factors that are important in the¯rst stage.
We¯nd that as in the case of foreign currency derivatives, exposure through foreign sales is an important determinant of a¯rm's decision on how much foreign debt to issue. This, too, is consistent with our hypothesis. We also¯nd that while larger¯rms are more likely to issue foreign debt, of those that do, smaller¯rms issue larger amounts of foreign debt. This is consistent with high¯xed start-up costs of issuing foreign debt.
Finally, we investigate further why exporters are not likely to issue debt, as suggested by Regression 1, Table 5 . We use a logit model (Regression 3, Table 5 ) to test a model of choice that compares the use of foreign currency derivatives and foreign debt. Our dependent variable is a binary equal to one if the¯rm uses only foreign currency derivatives, and zero if the¯rm uses only foreign debt.
We¯nd no signi¯cant evidence that multinationals prefer to use foreign currency derivatives or debt to hedge foreign currency exposure (the coe±cient on foreign sales is insignificant). However, we do¯nd signi¯cant evidence that exporters prefer the use of foreign currency derivatives over the use of foreign currency debt. This might be explained by the nature of exporting, which can require customized, short-term contracts that are better served by derivatives rather than by long-term foreign debt. Alternatively, it might be the lack of foreign institutional details that keeps exporters away from issuing foreign debt.
Overall, our results suggest that exposure through foreign sales is an important determinant of both a¯rm's decision to issue foreign debt and its decision on how much foreign debt to issue. These results are consistent with our hypothesis that¯rms use both foreign debt and foreign currency derivatives to hedge their exchange-rate exposure. In addition, whilē rms with operations abroad do not prefer one hedging instrument to another, exporters prefer the use of currency derivatives.
Conclusions
This paper examines whether¯rms use currency derivatives for hedging or for speculative purposes. Using a sample of S&P 500 non¯nancial¯rms for 1993, we examine the impact of currency derivatives on¯rm exchange-rate exposure, the factors that prompt corporations to hedge, and the factors that a®ect their decision on how much to hedge.
We¯nd a strong negative association between foreign currency derivative use and¯rm exchange-rate exposure, suggesting that¯rms use derivatives as a hedge rather than to speculate in the foreign exchange markets. This relation is robust to alternative time intervals and exchange-rate indices to estimate exposure and estimation methods (e.g., weighted least squares and probit) that we use to examine the relation between exchange rate exposure and currency derivative use.
We¯nd additional supportive evidence on the¯rm's hedging behavior, when we examine separately, using a two-stage framework, the factors that may be associated with a¯rm's decision to hedge and its decision on the level of hedging. We¯nd evidence that a¯rm's exposure through foreign sales and foreign trade is a very important factor that prompts corporations to hedge and guides their decision on how much to hedge.
Firms can also use foreign debt to protect themselves from exchange-rate movements.
Similarly, we¯nd that a¯rm's exposure through foreign sales is an important determinant of its decision to hedge and how much to hedge. Collectively, our results suggest that¯rms use currency derivatives and foreign debt as a hedge against their exchange-rate exposure.
Our paper has important implications for managers and¯nancial regulators. A¯rm's exposure to exchange-rate movements is mitigated through the use of foreign currency derivatives. This¯nding suggests that an intervention in the derivatives markets may not be warranted, and provides an explanation for the lack of signi¯cant exposure documented in past studies. 
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where R is¯rm's i common stock return, R is the return on the CRSP value-weighted market index and it mt F XI is the rate of return on an exchange-rate index (J.P Morgan's dollar index). We present the estimates t (top) and the corresponding t-statistics (bottom) for the intercept ® , the coe±cient of the ratio of foreign sales 1i to total sales ® and the coe±cient of the ratio of foreign currency derivatives ® for the cases in which we a;b;c denotes signi¯cance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Table 4 Factors explaining the use of FX derivatives
The table provides parameter estimates (top) and t-statistics (bottom) using Cragg's (1971) two-stage model. The¯rst stage (Regression 1) is a binomial probit estimation that relates factors proxying for theories of optimal hedging and for exposure to exchange-rate movements to a¯rm's likelihood of using currency derivatives. The dependent variable is a binary variable equal to 1 if a¯rm uses currency derivatives, and 0 otherwise. The second stage (Regression 2) is a truncated regression model in which we consider only those¯rms that chose to hedge for estimating which factors in°uence a¯rm's decision on the level of derivative use. 
